Automatic Authorization of Frisks in Terry Stops for Suspicion of Firearms Possession by Barondes, Royce de R.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
Fall 2018
Automatic Authorization of Frisks in Terry Stops
for Suspicion of Firearms Possession
Royce de R. Barondes
University of Missouri School of Law, articles@legal-environment.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Royce de R. Barondes, Automatic Authorization of Frisks in Terry Stops for Suspicion of Firearms Possession, 43 Southern Illinois
University Law Journal 1 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs/723
AUTOMATIC AUTHORIZATION OF FRISKS IN
TERRY STOPS FOR SUSPICION OF FIREARMS
POSSESSION
Royce de R. Barondes*
I. INTRODUCTION...................................................2
II. TERRY STOPS-THE PROCESS ETC. ............ 5................5
A. The Basic Legal Framework ............ .............. 5
B. Statistics-NYC ............................ 6
C. Use of Force in Terry Stops; Dividing Line with Arrest ............. 8
D. Danger Arising from Pointing a Weapon in a Terry Stop .......... 13
III. THE SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE CONCERNING AUTHORIZATION OF A
FRISK ........................................................... 15
IV. CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE IN CONFLICT .. ...................... 20
A. Contemporary Authority Finding Authorization for a Terry Stop
for Firearms Possession Automatically Authorizes a Frisk ....... 20
B. Contemporary Authority Finding Authorization for a Terry Stop
for Firearms Possession Does Not Automatically Authorize a
Frisk ......................................... 23
V. INCOHERENT AGGREGATE TREATMENT ARISING FROM BIFURCATION......27
VI. BALANCING THE COMPONENTS .............................. 28
A. Overview ...................................... 28
B. "General Interest in Crime Control" Is Disregarded ............. 32
C. No Special Rule for Firearms Possession .... ................ 34
D. Estimating the Frequencies .................... 35
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................... 40
1
James S. Rollins Professor of Law, University of Missouri. The author would like to acknowledge the
kind financial support of the W. Dudley McCarter Faculty Research Fellowship, the Robert & Edith
Young Family Foundation and the James C. Morrow Faculty Research Fellowship.
Copyright C 2018 Royce Barondes. All rights reserved.
2 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 43
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of adults in the U.S. holding concealed firearms permits
has grown explosively in recent years-according to a recent study, from
"2.7 million in 1999 to 4.6 million in 2007, 11 million in 2014, and 14.5
million in 2016."' The study further reports "[O]ur findings suggest that
nearly 9 million US adult handgun owners carry loaded handguns monthly,
approximately 3 million of whom do so every day, and that most report
protection as the primary reason for carrying regardless of carrying
frequency." 2
This increase has been accompanied by activist community
engagement, in which advocates seek to advance firearms rights by openly
carrying firearms.' Growth in both forms of firearms possession
Ali Rowhani-Rahbar et al., Loaded Handgun Carrying Among US Adults, 2015, 107 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1930, 1930 (2017).
A tally focused on persons -icensed to possess concealed firearms would undercount the persons
authorized. Jurisdictions are increasingly allowing the public possession of concealed firearms without
permits. The jurisdictional counts are rapidly moving targets. The tally provided in 2013 in Drake v.
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 441 (3d Cir. 2013), is, "[F]our States and parts of Montana allow concealed carry
without a permit and forty-four States allow concealed carry with a permit."
However, in 2016 alone, Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri and West Virginia eliminated the permit
requirement to carry a concealed weapon. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(4)(f) (Westlaw through 2016
Second Regular Session), amended by 2016 Idaho Senate Bill No. 1389, Idaho Sixty-Third Idaho
Legislature, Second Regular Session-2016 (adding, "(f) A concealed handgun by a person who is: (i)
Over twenty-one (21) years of age; (ii) A resident of Idaho; and (iii) Is not disqualified from being
issued a license under subsection (11) of this section."); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 45-9-101(24) (Westlaw
through 2016 First and Second Extraordinary Sessions and the 2016 Regular Session), amended by
2016 Miss. Laws, H.B. No. 786 (approved April 15, 2016); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (Westlaw
through the end of the 2016 Regular Session and Veto Session of the 98th General Assembly), amended
by 2016 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 656 (amending MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1), which defines "unlawful
use of weapons" as including some carrying of a concealed weapon, to limit the offense of unlawful
use of weapons arising from the carrying of a concealed weapon by adding the geographic limitation
"into any area where firearms are restricted under section 571.107"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-3
(Westlaw through legislation of the 2016 Regular Session), amended by West Virginia House Bill
4145, at 2 (passed Feb. 24, 2016).
New Hampshire and North Dakota eliminated their permit requirements in 2017. S.B. 12, 2017 N.H.
Laws ch. 1; H.B. 1169, 2017 N.D. Legis. Serv. No. 161 (West). Missouri's neighbor to the West,
Kansas, eliminated the permit requirement to possess a concealed firearm in 2015. See 2015 Kan. Sess.
Laws 231, 237.
2 Id. at 1935. The author's indicated methodology excluded police officers and those who did not identify
their employment from the data set regarding the frequency of carrying a firearm. Id. at 1931.
E.g., Deffert v. Moe, 111 F. Supp. 3d 797, 810-12 (W.D. Mich. 2015) (finding reasonable suspicion to
detain and temporarily disarm a person openly carrying a firearm across the street from a church
service, while singing Hakuna Matata); Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881, 887-88 (E.D. Mich.
2014) (involving open carriers admittedly were walking to "desensitize the public to open carry, and
to educate police officers with [sic] whom they may encounter on the legality of open carry"); Burgess
v. Wallingford, No. 11-CV-1 12, 2013 WL 4494481, at *1 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013) (addressing an
unsuccessful section 1983 lawsuit concerning a disorderly conduct arrest of an individual wearing a
shirt quoting a state provision addressing the right to bear arms and carrying copies of a public interest
group's brochure about the legality of carrying firearms), aff'd sub nom. Burgess v. Town of
Wallingford, 569 F. App'x 21 (2d Cir. 2014); Lovett v. State, 523 S.W.3d 342, 346-350 (Tex. App.
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(concealed and open) has increasingly drawn into focus the restrictions on
officer interaction with those possessing firearms. The basic relevant aspects
of the framework governing associated Terry stops is detailed in Part II.
One issue raised is whether reasonable suspicion of firearms possession
is by itself sufficient for an officer to initiate a Terry stop.4 That issue is the
subject of a separate work (which concludes reasonable suspicion of mere
firearms possession is not sufficient for an officer to initiate a Terry stop,
rejecting contemporary authority that focuses on whether, in the relevant
jurisdiction, licensure is an affirmative defense to a base firearms crime or
non-licensure is an element to the crime).5
This Article examines the related issue of whether a Terry stop initiated
for reasonable suspicion that a person is armed inherently authorizes
treatment of the detainee as armed and dangerous (and thus authorizes a
frisk). As shown in Part III, the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence is
equivocal on the point. Part IV illustrates the conflicting approaches taken by
contemporary lower courts. This Article concludes a frisk is not inherently
authorized in such a stop, for two separate reasons.
First, and most fundamentally, insofar as the stop is authorized because
it is supposed the stop is a mere inconvenience-it's merely to check for a
license-and thus is not unduly burdensome, it is inconsistent to then
conclude that the stop inherently authorizes the pointing of a firearm at the
subject. (More detail is provided in Part V.) And, as shown in Part II.C, if a
subject is treated as armed and dangerous-the criterion for authorizing the
frisk-courts typically hold the subject can be frisked with weapons drawn.
Such a stop is not a mere trifling inconvenience.
Second, more broadly, this Article sketches some factors relevant to any
putative judicial balancing that might be recited as justifying frisks in this
context. Part VI does so by first sketching the number of Terry stops that
would be added simply focusing on stops of persons, not police officers, who
carry firearms daily. We can easily conclude that even with relatively modest
frequencies of stopping those persons, there would be a substantial increase
in the most hazardous Terry stops.
In light of the controversy generated by the level of Terry stops in the
recent past, a substantial benefit would be required in any balancing that
found the increase in stops to be reasonable. However, as revealed in Part
VI.B, prior Supreme Court authority in fact indicates the benefits of which a
2017), petition for discretionary review refused (Oct. 18, 2017) (involving a person possessing a
holstered antique pistol while spectating at a traffic stop, wearing a shirt with the slogan, "Keep Calm
and Film the Police."). See generally Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1443, 1521
(2009).
4 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Royce de R. Barondes, Conditioning Exercise ofFirearms Rights on Unlimited Terry Stops, IDAHO L.
REv. (forthcoming 2018).
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court may take cognizance, when balancing stops where probable cause is
absent, are limited to the possession and transport itself, and exclude remote
consequences prevented by the stops.
As shown in Part VI.D, the rates at which persons are prosecuted by the
federal government for lying in connection with seeking to obtain a firearm
are minuscule. That suggests a low federal interest in curtailing the mere
possession of a firearm by persons whose possession is unlawful.
This combination-a substantial increase in hazardous Terry stops that
would need to be justified by curtailment of mere possession, which
historical federal prosecution rates would indicate is a low federal priority-
casts substantial doubt on any balancing justification for frisking one who is
stopped for mere suspicion of firearms possession. One might assert that even
though there is little federal stomach to prosecute these mere possession
crimes, states have a greater interest. This inquiry poses something of a
puzzle.
Virginia v. Moore6 holds, "We conclude that warrantless arrests for
crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under
the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests
however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's
protections."' The principles of Virginia v. Moore have been extended to
detentions short of arrests.' So we have the converse issue: Whether state
interests in interdiction of crime can enhance the balancing in favor of the
stop, where the activity is also a federal crime but one of low priority.
We are not here concerned with an ordinary case. That is because the
search implicates more than general concerns protected by the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches. In addition, these hazardous
searches can result in people foregoing' the exercise of what courts
customarily treat as an enumerated federal constitutional right: the right to
bear arms outside the home, which typically is treated in contemporary
jurisprudence as protected by the Second Amendment."o And the
contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing that right rejects
balancing in assessing its contours."
It is not suggested that reference to these components or any discussion
of "balancing" will compel a particular result. The balancing process does
not yield conclusions compelled by deductive analysis. Rather, although
courts ought to be involved in applying constitutional text, discussions
framed in terms of balancing often involve justifications for conclusions that
6 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
Id. at 176.
E.g., State v. Slayton, 223 P.3d 337, 344, 347 (N.M. 2009); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.5(a) (5th ed. Westlaw through Oct. 2017)
("Moore is applicable to statutes limiting which state agents may make a Terry stop . . .
See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 110, 146 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
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are reached on policy considerations not operationally constrained by the
constitutional language.
II. TERRY STOPS-THE PROCESS, ETC.
A. The Basic Legal Framework
Under Terry v. Ohiol2 and its progeny, "reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning
limited to the purpose of the stop."" Significantly for our purposes, the
Supreme Court has, in concluding a Terry stop was not justified in a
particular context, relied on the fact that relevant factors alleged to support
the stop "describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers,
who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to
conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a
seizure."' 4 In 1985, the Court held the authorization to conduct a Terry stop
is not limited to investigation of crimes in progress."
The Terry court holds an officer may be entitled to search (commonly
referenced as a "frisk"l 6 ) a subject detained during such a stop:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where
he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause
to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether
a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted
in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.17
Contemporary courts typically hold a Terry stop is not invalidated by
the fact that it is pretextual." In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court
holds that where there is probable cause a traffic violation has been
committed, that the choice to detain a subject is pretextual, i.e., for purposes
of investigating other potential crimes, does not make the stop
12 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
14 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (discussing innocuous travel arrangements); see also
United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 967-68 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Reid).
Is United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985). Hensley expressly reserves application of the
principle beyond completed felonies. Id. at 229.
6 Teny, 392 U.S. at 10.
1 Id. at 27.
1s See infra note 22.
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unconstitutional.19 There are occasional lower-court statements to the effect
that the authorization of pretextual stops with probable cause allowed by
Whren does not extend to pretextual Terry stops. 20 But there are statements
to the contrary,2 ' which appear to be the current majority.22
B. Statistics of Stops
New York City adopted policies governing stop-and-frisk practices that
resulted in "[t]he number of stops per year r[ising] sharply from 314,000 in
2004 to a high of 686,000 in 201 1.",23 In the following year, there were only
19 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) ("Their principal basis-which applies
equally to attempts to reach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means-is simply that
the Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain
circumstances, whatever the subjective intent."). See also United States v. Roggeman, 279 F.3d
573, 581 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (discussing Whren and other authority).
Of course, a pretextual stop may be prohibited under state law. See, e.g., State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d
833, 836 (Wash. 1999); Michael Sievers, State v. Ochoa: The End of Pretextual Stops in New
Mexico?, 42 N.M. L. REv. 595, 595 (2012) (identifying three jurisdictions).
Additionally, there is authority to the effect that the justifying pretextual circumstance must actually
have been perceived. See United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237-40 (3d Cir. 2012). But see
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (holding the exclusionary rule did not prevent
introduction of evidence discovered in an arrest following an invalid stop, where the person was
subject to an outstanding warrant unknown to the detaining officer).
It is easy to identify circumstances where engaging in innocuous activity is sufficient to make a
person subject to unbridled searches. E.g., United States v. Winters, No. 16-CR-146-JPS, 2017
WL 2703527, at *5 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 2017) (including "blading" in a list of indicators of criminal
conduct); State v. Norfolk, 366 S.W.3d 528, 532-34 (Mo. 2012) (quoting the following police
officer testimony: "In the past of every weapons arrest I've been assisting or been on, a lot of
individuals that carry weapons happen to adjust the weapon for some reason when the police
come."); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 9.5(g) (collecting circumstances).
20 Mason v. Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 726, 738-39 (Ct. App. Va. 2015) (Humphreys, J.,
dissenting) ("Moreover, while pretextual stops are permissible under the Supreme Court's holding
in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), that is only so if probable cause exists that an
offense has been committed." (parallel citation omitted)), aff'd, 786 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 2016). See
generally JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3:4 (3d ed. Westlaw
through June 2017) ("Decisions are not entirely in agreement when there is evidence that the
detention was pretextual. Most courts hold that if the officer could have detained the individual
legitimately then her actual motivation is immaterial. A few courts, however, require the
prosecution to show not only that the officer could have detained but that she would have detained
the party absent the ulterior motive. In any event, if reasonable suspicion is present at the time of
the stop, that it turns out to be ill-founded is inconsequential." (footnotes omitted)).
21 United States v. Miles, No. 3:05CR204 (EBB), 2006 WL 1405577, at *4 (D. Conn. May 18, 2006)
("As an initial matter, the subjective intent ofan officer making a Terry stop is ofno moment where
the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for the stop."), affid, 263 F. App'x 77 (2d Cir. 2008)
(discussing, however, a traffic stop and a traffic violation); State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353,
360-61 (Iowa 2000) ("[W]e think there should be no distinction between a stop based on probable
cause and a stop based on reasonable suspicion, i.e., a Terry stop.... In other words, both tests are
objective."), abrogated in part by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).
22 COOK, supra note 20, § 3:4.
23 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). LaFave and his co-authors
describe the subsequent history of the case as follows:
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533,042 stops. 24 The New York City population was 8,175,133 in 2010.25 So,
ignoring any change in the rate arising from a change in the population over
one or two years, that would translate to a rate of 0.084 Terry stops per person
in 2011 and 0.065 in 2012.26 Its practices were held unconstitutional in Floyd
v. City ofNew York.2 7
Philadelphia somewhat astonishingly almost doubled that rate of Terry
stops. The rate of stops in Philadelphia reached 0.158 per person in 2009.28
At least in the New York City experience, these stops do not seem to
have been highly effective in identifying persons who possess firearms.
"Evidence that the hit rates for weapons, guns in particular-the ostensible
justification for this aggressive program of stop-and-frisk-are abysmally
low." 29 Floyd v. City ofNew York" notes:
Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, 1.1% of the stops
of Hispanics, and 1.4% of the stops of whites.
Contraband other than weapons was seized in 1.8% of the stops of
blacks, 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and 2.3% of the stops of whites."
A New York Times article discussing "stops" identifies 1.55% and
1.29% of those of Blacks and whites involve officers "draw[ing] weapons,"
Prior to argument on the appeal, New York elected a new mayor, who had strongly
opposed the NYPD program (in contrast to the former mayor). The City then obtained
a limited remand for the purpose of exploring a settlement, Ligon v. City of New York,
743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014). The City then entered into a settlement based on the
remedies that had been imposed by the district court ruling, including a court-appointed
monitor "overseeing the NYPD's reform of its stop and frisk policy."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.5(j) n.355 (4th ed. Westlaw through Dec.
2017) (citations omitted).
24 N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Report on the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk Policy 5 (May 2013),
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072495-StopFriskReport.pdf
25 United States Census, Population Estimates, https://web.archive.org/web/20150915233910/
http://www.census.gov:80/popest/data/cities/totals/2014/SUB-EST2014.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2018) (collecting population data for cities and states).
26 That is, 685,724/8,175,133 = 0.084; and 533,042/8,175,133 = 0.065. This author has concluded
the utility of using a different denominator from the census-reported 2010 number, allowing annual
variations, would involve unnecessary precision. For our purposes, we are interested in the general
magnitude of the relationships. Floyd finds the process is invalid as racially discriminatory, see
infra note 27 and accompanying text, which suggests that one seeking a greater level of precision
would need to make some assessment of racial disparities and re-weight statistics in seeking to
create rates that are comparable in New York City and Philadelphia and medium- and large-sized
cities generally. This author has concluded that it is implausible that the level of precision required
by that would alter the analysis, and thus would introduce unnecessary complexity in exposition.
27 959 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
28 David Rudovsky, Stop-and-Frisk: The Power of Data and the Decision in Floyd v. City of New
York, 162 U. PA. L. REv. ONLNE 118, 123 (2013). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences
of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L.
REv. 2397, 2398 (discussing additional statistics).
29 Barry Friedman, Why Do Courts Defer to Cops?, 130 HARv. L. REv. F. 323, 330 (2017).
30 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
31 Id. at 559.
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respectively.32 The article further reports a weapon is "point[ed]"
approximately one-third of the stops in which a weapon is drawn.3 3 So,
perhaps one-third of the times a weapon is drawn in a Terry stop, it is pointed.
C. Dividing Line Separating Arrests
Use of force, including drawing a weapon, does not inherently convert
a Terry stop into an arrest34 requiring a higher threshold of proof of criminal
activity be met. So, an officer's drawing a weapon on a person in a vehicle
at a Veterans of Foreign Wars building alone did not convert a Terry stop
into an arrest.3 5 In fact, Alice Ristroph concludes, "For example, lower
federal courts have widely endorsed the routine practices of drawing
weapons and handcuffing suspects during Terry stops, on the grounds that
such stops are dangerous."3 6
Additionally, that the use of force consists of pointing a firearm at a
subject will not inherently transform a Terry stop into an arrest. For
32 Quoctrung Bui & Amanda Cox, Surprising New Evidence Shows Bias in Police Use ofForce but
Not in Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/07/12/upshot/surprising-new-evidence-shows-bias-in-police-use-of-force-but-not-in-shoot
ings.html. Bui and Cox's article cites by hyperlink to Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis
ofRacial Differences in Police Use ofForce, (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research Working Paper No.
22399, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22399. An updated version of the paper, Roland G.
Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis ofRacial Differences in Police Use ofForce, at 4 (July 2017),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/fryer/publications/empirical-analysis-racial-differences-police-use-
force, states, "For instance, 0.26 percent of interactions between police and civilians involve an
officer drawing a weapon . . . ." This author has been unable to link Bui and Cox's statistic to an
underlying source.
For ease of exposition, this Article will proceed on the basis that Bui and Cox's statistic is accurate,
as opposed to being overstated by perhaps an order of magnitude. For purposes of our exposition,
our analysis is biased in favor of conservatism by using a rate that is higher.
3 Bui & Cox, supra note 32.
34 E.g., United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2004) ("It is well established, however,
that when officers are presented with serious danger in the course of carrying out an investigative
detention, they may brandish weapons or even constrain the suspect with handcuffs in order to
control the scene and protect their safety.") United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir.
1990); People v. Glaser, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (Cal. 1995) (citing authority from the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits).
3 Billingsley v. State, 980 N.E.2d 402, 405, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (distinguishing authority where
there was not reasonable suspicion a subject was armed, and stating, "On these facts, Officer
Lichtsinn withdrew his firearm only because he had a specific and reasonable belief that Billingsley
may have been armed . . . [I]t would have been unreasonable to expect Officer Lichtsinn to
approach Billingsley without his gun drawn because the risk to the officer's safety was simply too
great."), transfer granted, opinion vacated, 984 N.E.2d 221 (id. 2013), vacated and opinion
reinstated, 994 N.E.2d 1101 (Ind. 2013).
36 Alice Ristroph, The Constitution ofPolice Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1207 n.104 (2017).
37 See generally, e.g., United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting, "[O]ther
circuits have held that police officers may draw their weapons without transforming an otherwise
valid Terry stop into an arrest."); Fuchs v. Sanders, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1139, 1148 (D. Colo.
2009) (validating a Terry a stop involving pointing a firearm at a woman, in an investigation of a
recent burglary of golf clubs); Com. v. Alvarado, 693 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Mass. 1998) ("The armed
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example, in United States v. Howard,18 the Seventh Circuit justifies a Terry
stop of a person accompanying one being arrested for a violent crime
involving a firearm.39 In the stop, the officer apparently pointed a firearm at
the complaining subject.40 The court concludes the dangerousness of the
circumstances, involving a Terry stop of a person accompanying a subject of
"dangerous arrest," was sufficient to authorize pointing a firearm at the
subject of the detention analyzed under Terry principles. In reaching the
conclusion, the court explicitly notes that officer "did not have any particular
reason at that moment to believe [any of the subjects of Terry stops] was
dangerous."4 1
Schubert v. City of Springfield42 illustrates the officer-safety-centric
structure of the way courts analyze the use of force in Terry stops. It notes,
"[O]nce [the officer] had reasonable suspicion justifying a stop, he was
permitted to take actions to ensure his own safety."43
Consider the circumstances. The case, according to the allegations,
involves a prominent criminal defense lawyer, at least middle-aged and
dressed in a suit jacket, who was licensed in Massachusetts to carry a
firearm.44 The lawyer was stopped in front of a city courthouse to investigate
the lawyer's possession of a handgun.45 For this, an officer pointed his
firearm at the lawyer's face, disarmed the lawyer and, notwithstanding
having seen the lawyer's license, which identified his status as a lawyer,
show of force by the police in ordering the men out of the stopped car, frisking them for weapons,
and then examining the interior of the car for weapons did not necessarily place the men under
arrest. In a justified stop, as this was, the police may take reasonable precautions to protect
themselves and the public, and these precautions will not turn an investigative inquiry into an arrest
so long as the force used by the police is commensurate with the extent of the danger. Reliable
information that the men may have possessed a sawed-off shotgun in their car provided the police
with ample justification to draw their guns while ordering the men out of the car as a precaution
against the use of that weapon by one of the men." (citation omitted)); Brown v. State, 944 P.2d
1168, 1170, 1172 (Wyo. 1997) (holding that ordering persons out of a vehicle at gunpoint did not
transform the interaction into an arrest).
38 729 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2013).
* Id. at 659.
40 See id. at 657 (stating the officer "turned his gun toward" the subject of the Terry stop and ordered
him and others to the ground); id at 660 (referencing the individual "[b]eing ordered to the ground
at gunpoint"). The defendant's brief, citing a magistrate's finding of fact, explicitly states the
firearm was pointed at the subject. Opening Brief and Short Appendix of Appellant Darius Howard
at 4, United States v. Howard, 729 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1256), 2013 WL 1095138, at
*4.
41 Howard, 729 F.3d at 659.
42 589 F.3d 496 (1st Cir. 2009).
43 Id. at 503; see also, e.g., Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating, "Ordering [the
firearm possessor] to the ground at gun point was not an excessive intrusion given the existence of
a loaded weapon, the risk to officer (or public) safety if [he] had been up to no good and the danger
to law enforcement whenever it disarms an individual suspected of crime.").
44 Schubert, 589 F.3d at 499.
45 Id.
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partially Mirandized him and placed him in the back of a cruiser.46 The
officer reportedly told the lawyer that "he[, the officer,] was the only person
allowed to carry a weapon on his beat."4 7
In concluding the manner of the stop was reasonable, the court
continues:
The officer took several reasonable steps given that [the lawyer]
was an unknown armed man walking in that particular location: he
emerged quickly from his vehicle, drew his gun, executed a pat-
frisk, requested identification and a gun license, attempted to
confirm the validity of the licenses, and escorted [the lawyer] into
the cruiser after [the lawyer] moved from the position in which the
officer had instructed him to remain. All these actions were related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial stop, namely,
[the lawyer]'s open possession of a weapon in front of a
courthouse. [The officer's] concern for his own safety and for the
safety of others was the context for this stop. It is "clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary
measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm."48
A variety of cases concentrate the analysis on what the officer
reasonably believes necessary to assure his safety, de-emphasizing the
impact on the subject, in addressing whether a particular level of force
46 Id. at 499-500.
47 Id. at 500.
48 Id. at 503 (quoting United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)).
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is authorized.4 9 In United States v. Taylor,o the Ninth Circuit
articulates the following rationale for concluding officers were
authorized to point weapons at a detainee, analyzed under5 ' Terry
principles. The detainee in question, one Pressler, was accompanying
one Taylor, whose residence was the subject of a search warrant
associated with suspicion of manufacturing amphetamines. 5 2 The court
supports the conclusion that a determination a person should be
considered dangerous is sufficient to point a weapon at him during a
Terry stop:
The Supreme Court has recognized "that the policeman making a
reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity
to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect." The purpose
of a Terry stop is "to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
without fear of violence". Earlier on the day in question, Agent
Dick and the other officers on the scene had attended a briefing
49 This type of deference is not limited to the fact of taking some intrusive, allegedly excessive action
putatively to protect officer safety. In addition, it can result in objections that precautionary activity
taken on behalf of an officer lasted too long. Here as well one can encounter substantial deference
to the officer.
For example, Maney v. Garrison, 681 F. App'x. 210 (4th Cir. 2017), examines a canine
officer's detention of a person hiding behind a bush. During a search for a robbery
suspect, the officer's dog found and started biting a person obviously not the suspect-
he was of a different race. Id. at 212-13. The case addresses whether clearly established
law did not allow the officer to await stopping a dog biting an innocent detainee not
matching the sought-for subject's description, pending the detainee's showing his hands.
Id. at 212. The court holds allowing the biting of the innocent, pending display of his
hands, was not identified, under clearly established law, as unreasonable. Id. at 212. The
opinion notes, "Indeed, given that [the police dog] confused Appellant's scent for the
suspect's, we think a reasonable officer could have believed the two were hiding
together or had recently been in close contact."
Id. at 219-20. A footnote continues:
This point bears emphasis. Some police dogs are trained to bite the first person they encounter,
making no distinction between suspects and bystanders. But [the officer] repeatedly testified,
and it is undisputed in the record, that, unless he is ordered to do so or responding to an attack,
[this dog] will not bite unless he smells the scent of the subject he is tracking. Given this
distinction, we think a reasonable officer would be entitled to draw certain inferences from
[this dog's] actions that could not be drawn from the actions of a less discerning dog.
Id. at 220 n.4 (citations omitted).
The court quotes prior authority as follows, "[A] jury could find it objectively unreasonable to
require someone to put his hands up and calmly surrender while a police dog bites his scrotum."
Id. at 217 (quoting Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1991)). To this author, one should
suppose the conclusion is more clear than merely that a jury might so find. The equivocation
suggests an unsuitable balancing contrary to the interests of the public at large.
5o 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983).
51 The detainee was accompanying a person whose residence was the subject of a search warrant. Id.
at 705.
52 Id. at 705, 708.
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where they had been told that Taylor was dangerous and were
warned that others with Taylor should also be considered
dangerous.5 3
A footnote in Taylor cites discussion in Terry stating, inter alia:
We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest
in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly
it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take
unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American
criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year
in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line
of duty, and thousands more are wounded.54
The focus on officer safety in ascertaining whether it was reasonable to
point a firearm at a person during a Terry stop is reflected in this discussion:
"Consequently, we must consider the totality of the circumstances to
determine if the means used by the police, including detention at gunpoint,
were justified by the need ofa 'reasonably prudent' officer to protect himself
and others involved in the search."55
The tenor of the analyses is reflected in a string of citations provided in
Howard v. Ealing.56 We may focus on a three-sentence paragraph in the
opinion that is supported by assorted citations to authority. The language,
excluding citations, is as follows:
And when performing a valid investigatory stop, an officer's
pointing a gun at a person is not per se unreasonable. Rather,
"[s]ome force may be reasonable during an investigatory stop
when the circumstances give rise to a justifiable fear for personal
safety on the part of the officer." An officer has "a right to protect
himself, and to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence." 57
53 Id. at 708 (footnote omitted) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); and Adams,
407 U.S. at 146)).
54 Id. at 708 n.4 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)).
5 People v. Glaser, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (Cal. 1995) (citations omitted).
56 876 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ind. 2012).
5 Id. at 1066-67 (quoting Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 932 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); and Johnson v.
City of Milwaukee, 41 F. Supp. 2d 917, 925 (E.D.Wis.1999)).
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. The second sentence in this quotation is followed by parenthetical
summaries of prior cases, including:
(a) "noting that once the officers had reasonable suspicion to
suspect that the plaintiff had threatened someone with a pistol, they
were justified in drawing their weapons for their own protection as
they effectuated the stop;"58 and
(b) "It is well established ... that when officers are presented with
serious danger in the course of carrying out an investigative
detention, they may brandish weapons or even constrain the
suspect with handcuffs in order to control the scene and protect
their safety." 59
The citation for the third sentence in this quotation includes the
following parenthetical summary:
holding that an officer's act of drawing his gun was reasonable
where officer had just observed what he reasonably believed was
a battery and individuals involved could have been armed,
regardless of whether officer intended only to detain rather than
arrest the suspect.60
D. Danger Arising from Pointing a Weapon in a Terry Stop
Dangerous conditions are created by encounters in which officers point
loaded firearms at subjects who do not otherwise present danger of inflicting
serious bodily injury. Pointing a loaded firearm at a person is not simply
threatening61 but is, in fact, a dangerous activity. A pistol, when carried by
police, typically has a cartridge chambered,62 in a condition that allows a
ss Id. at 1066 (citingPaige v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:09-cv-143, 2010 WL 3522526, at *6 (N.D.
Ind. Sept. 2, 2010).
5 Id. at 1066-67 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 973 (8th
Cir.2004)) (citations omitted in Ealing).
60 Id. at 1067 (summarizing Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 41 F. Supp. 2d 917,925 (E.D. Wis. 1999)).
61 See generally Christian v. Orr, No. CIV.A. 08-2397, 2011 WL 710209, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1,
2011) (summarizing prior authority, Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th
Cir.2002), as supporting the proposition that 'brandishing a cocked gun' in front of an individual's
face lays 'the building blocks for a § 1983 claim' even in the absence of any physical injury"), affid
as amended, 512 F. App'x 242 (3d Cir. 2013).
62 E.g., Transcript of Testimony of John Cerar at 70-71, Colo. Outfitters Ass'n v. Hickenlooper, 24
F. Supp. 3d 1050 (D. Colo. 2014) (No. 13-cv-01300-MSK-MJW), 2014 WL 11369690 ("Q. All
right. Do you know the magazine capacity in the firearms that NYPD officers carry today? A. Yes.
It's 15-round magazines. Officers are also required on patrol to carry two additional magazines. So
a New York City police officer would have fifteen rounds in a magazine, one round in the chamber,
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bullet to be discharged by the single act of moving the trigger (unless the
firearm has a thumb safety that must be disengaged).6 3
An unanticipated interruption or disturbance can cause an involuntary
movement of a finger, firing the weapon. Or there may be an unintentional
sympathetic reaction 64 -moving a hand that is not holding a pistol may
produce unintentional movement in the hand holding a pistol.6 5 Or a person
who has a firearm trained on another may lose his balance and, in the process,
discharge the pistol.
By way of illustration, consider the circumstances of Stamps v. Town of
Framingham.6 6 An officer accidentally shot and killed an elderly subject who
was lying in a hallway." The officer claimed that he lost his balance and, in
the process, his rifle discharged.68
Thus, ordinary rules of firearm safety include, "Never point the gun at
anything you are not prepared to see destroyed."6 9 This principle, familiar to
recreational shooters, is also part of training for law enforcement. 0
There are, of course, more broadly-expressed concerns about the danger
created by officer stops. "In the past several years alone, there has been a rash
of police shootings and other uses of excessive force against individuals who
were either unarmed or presented no threat of physical harm to the
officers."n
and thirty additional rounds. So all uniformed police officers are required to carry 46 rounds of
ammunition." (emphasis added)), vacated and remanded, 823 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 2016); Report of
Affidavit of Capt. George Stoner et al. at 5, Amin-Helton v. City of Tucson, No. C2006 5129, 2010
WL 2019637 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2010), 2006 WL 6609375 (noting, "General Order 2051.45
- Firearms Carrying states in relevant part '. . . All members shall maintain a clean, charged and
fully loaded firearm. . ."' (omissions in original)).
63 See generally Telephonic Examination of Michael Shain at 34-40, Mantooth v. Glock, Inc., No.
2:09-cv-1 3125. (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7,2009), 2011 WL 7430676 (involving an expert discussing the
relative merits of thumb safeties on firearms, stating, "And there is lots of studies and reports and
documentation about law enforcement agencies that have looked at the issue of whether or not it's
desirable to have a manual safety on their duty weapons. And far and away the response and results
of those have been no, it's not a desirable feature.").
64 John O'Neill et al., Toward at Taxonomy of the Unintentional Discharge of Firearms in Law
Enforcement, 59 APPLIED ERGONOMIcs 283, 283 (2017).
65 See id.
66 813 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016).
67 Id. at 29-30.
68 Expert Report of Kim R. Windup at 2-3, Stamps v. Town of Framingham, 38 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.
Mass. 2014) (Civil No. 12-11908-FDS), affd, 813 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016).
69 MASSAD AYOOB, GUN DIGEST BOOK OF CONCEALED CARRY at 254 (2d ed. 2012). See Perez v.
City of Los Angeles, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 825-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (identifying this rule as
one of the "four cardinal rules of firearm safety").
7o E.g., Expert Report of John J. Ryan at 17, Sollman v. Renninger, No. 07-1183, 2008 WL 5156617
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2008), 2009 WL 6686033.
n Thornton v. City of Columbus, No. 2:15-CV-1337, 2017 WL 2573252, at *12 n.10 (S.D. Ohio
June 14, 2017). See generally id. (providing as one of a number of illustrations, "Philando Castile,
lawfully registered to carry a firearm, was shot and killed by an officer who suspected him of a
robbery based on his appearance. Mr. Castile's girlfriend, present at the time of the shooting, stated
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One can encounter anecdotal evidence that concern generated by these
types of events may alter whether persons exercise the right to bear arms.72
So, one can see such statements as the following by a person identified as a
certified pistol instructor:
And I have a duty to inform any officer who stops me that I am
carrying and that I have a permit for it. But how they react to that,
I can't say. And that scares me. So I would rather not have a
firearm on me and give someone a reason, even in their minds, to
shoot. 73
III. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE CONCERNING AUTHORIZATION
OF A FRISK
Part II has detailed background statistics of Terry stops. It also has
explored the danger created by initiating a Terry stop if the subject is treated
as armed and dangerous. This Part examines the indeterminate Supreme
Court authority bearing on what is necessary for an officer to conclude the
subject is dangerous. The following Part addresses contemporary lower court
authority.
At times, the language in Terry references reasonable suspicion a
person is armed and dangerous, which would apparently mean that both are
required. On the other hand, at times it might be read, in isolation, to suggest
that reasonable suspicion one is armed is, by itself, sufficient to initiate a frisk
during a proper Terry stop. Relevant language may be parsed in the following
that the officer fired his weapon four times after Mr. Castile attempted to get his ID and wallet.").
See also, e.g., Schaefer v. Whitted, 121 F. Supp. 3d 701 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (involving a resident
shot and killed on his property by an officer who sought to disarm him by surprise).
72 E.g., Lisa Marie Pane, Black Women Picking up Firearms for Self-Defense, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (July 24, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-07-24/black-women-
picking-up-firearms-for-self-defense ("'It's disheartening to think that you have everything in
order: Your license to carry. You comply. You're not breaking the law. You're not doing anything
wrong. And there's a possibility you could be shot and killed,' said Laura Manning, a 50-year-old
payroll specialist for ADP from Atlanta.").
n Julia Craven, Why Black People Own Guns, HUFFPOST (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://www.huffmgtonpost.com/entry/black-gun-ownershipus 5a33fc38e4b040881bea2f37.
See also Tracy Mumford, To Be Black and Armed in Minnesota, MPRNEws (June 23, 2017),
https://www.mpmews.org/story/2017/06/23/black-gun-owners-on-yanez-verdict (reporting
discussion between a Black trainer and a former student concerning whether the former student
should continue to carry a firearm). Cf Philip Smith, Is Open Carry Too Dangerous For African
Americans?, AMMOLAND (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.ammoland.com/2016/03/is-open-carry-too-
dangerous-for-african-americans/#axzz53PLuvlnh ("The second school of thought is that if you
'Open Carry' you put yourself in harms way with the public as an African American because you
have a gun and it can be a big problem for some local law enforcement and the general public. ...
Why put yourself in that type of problem when you can avoid it all together.").
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way (the referenced language being quoted is in the margin, annotated to
show language corresponding to the components listed in body text):74
(i) As to initiating a frisk, the discussion in Terry initially requires
the individual be armed and dangerous.
(ii) It then indicates absolute certainty is not required. For our
purposes, that does not assist in determining the number of
components of the analysis.
(iii) It then expresses a test focusing on apprehension of danger-
not referencing the individual being armed.
(iv) In the third sentence of the second paragraph quoted in the
margin, the language references whether "a reasonably prudent
man would have been warranted in believing petitioner was armed
and thus presented a threat." That would suggest a determination
the individual was armed is sufficient to initiate a frisk.
However, that fourth statement (i.e., the statement annotated "(iv)")
follows reference to the suspected crime being a "stick-up." The suspected
crime matters. The suspected crime at issue in Terry is one where one can
have an apprehension of physical violence if the perpetrator is armed. Thus,
after recognizing the context in which the phrase is used, all one can conclude
from the usage of "armed and thus presented a threat" is that if a person is
suspected to be engaging in activity that is dangerous to others if done while
armed, and that person is suspected of being armed-then that person can be
suspected of being armed and dangerous.75
74 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968), states in part:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude
that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, [(i)] where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for
a crime. The officer [(ii)] need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
[(iii)] whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger .. .We must now examine the conduct of Officer
McFadden in this case to determine whether his search and seizure of petitioner were reasonable,
both at their inception and as conducted. He had observed Terry, together with Chilton and another
man, acting in a manner he took to be preface to a 'stick-up.' We think on the facts and
circumstances Officer McFadden detailed before the trial judge a reasonably prudent man would
have been warranted in believing [(iv)] petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the
officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior.
Id.
75 One can therefore summarily reject an argument such as:
The Court stated in its majority opinion that the frisk in that case was warranted
because the officer reasonably believed the detainee "was armed .and thus presented
a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior."
This language, "armed and thus," on which the Fourth Circuit in Robinson II rightly
placed great emphasis, shows that the Terry court believed that danger flowed from
the fact that the suspect was armed and did not exist as a separate factor.
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Moreover, the opinion at the end, in language purportedly describing
what the Court "hold[s]," uses the phrase "armed and presently dangerous," 76
which makes it difficult to assert plausibly that the holding involves allowing
a frisk on reasonable suspicion one is armed or presently dangerous.
Turning to subsequent authority, Adams v. Williams77 involves a Terry
stop and frisk following an officer's receipt of a tip that a person in a vehicle
in a high-crime area at 2:15 a.m. possessed narcotics and a firearm. 78 The
opinion notes that when the occupant rolled-down.the window, the officer
reached into the vehicle and removed a firearm from the subject's
waistband-a firearm that had not been visible.79 The case validates the stop
and frisk."
-The case does not inherently validate a frisk for mere suspicion of
firearms possession. The circumstances, from the time of day and the activity
and the tip itself, indicate suspicion of trafficking in controlled substances. A
variety of courts have expressed the view that dealing in narcotics is a crime
that gives rise to suspicion of dangerousness."
Matthew J. Wilkins, Note, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment ofFirearms in Terry
Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1176 (2017) (emphasis supplied by Wilkins) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28) (citing United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017)).
76 The opinion explicitly describes its holding as follows:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and
any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
7 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
7 Id. at 144-45.
7 Id. at 144.
so Id. at 148.
81 For example, Commonwealth v. Patterson, 591 A.2d 1075, 1078-79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (citation
style conformed), states:
Today we additionally join the growing number of courts who have takenjudicial notice
of the fact drug dealers are likely to be armed and dangerous. See United States v.
Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d Cir.1985); Commonwealth v. Davidson, 566 A.2d 897
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (it is well known that the distribution of narcotics is often
punctuated by acts of violence involving various lethal weapons); United States v.
Morales, 549 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (to substantial dealers in narcotics, firearms
are as much tools of the trade as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotics
paraphernalia); United States v. Wiener, 534 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
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Moreover, the Court expressly references factors in addition to firearms
possession in concluding there was reasonable suspicion of dangerousness-
discussion that would be irrelevant were mere suspicion of firearms
possession sufficient to initiate a frisk.8 2
Michigan v. Long" stands for the following: If a person, when outside
a vehicle and encountering police following a traffic accident,8 4 appears to
be under the "influence of something,"" balks at providing a license and
registration8 and approaches a drivers' compartment where a hunting knife
is on the floor,87 the officers can seize the knife and pat-down the subject."
In that context, the court states:
Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search
based on the discovery of the hunting knife because Long
possessed that weapon legally. Assuming arguendo that Long
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view
that the validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon
is possessed in accordance with state law. 89
This says nothing about whether the presence of a weapon, by itself-
by a person who is not balking at complying with a lawful officer request,
who is not apparently under the influence of a substance and who does not
then move to a location allowing the weapon to be grasped-is sufficient to
conclude the individual is armed and dangerous.
Barlin, 686 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982) (an officer's actions should be measured against a
background which includes the violent nature of narcotics crimes).
Id. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977), describes firearms as "tools of the trade"
of substantial dealers of narcotics: "[W]e have recognized that to 'substantial dealers in narcotics'
firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotics
paraphernalia." This supports concluding a 1970s conceptualization of narcotics trafficking with
firearms implicates use of the firearms as part ofthat illegal activity.
82 The opinion states:
While properly investigating the activity of a person who was reported to be carrying narcotics and
a concealed weapon and who was sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning,
Sgt. Connolly had ample reason to fear for his safety. When Williams rolled down his window,
rather than complying with the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his movements
could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at Williams' waist became an even greater threat.
Under these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was
thought to be hidden constituted a limited.intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude
that it was reasonable.
Adams, 407 U.S. at 147-48 (footnote omitted).
83 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
84 Id. at 1035.
85 Id at 1036.
86 Id
87 Id.
8 Id. at 1050-51.
8 Id. at 1052 n.16 (citation omitted).
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Additional Supreme Court authority includes Pennsylvania v. Mimms,90
where the court in a per curiam opinion issued without merits briefing 91
primarily focuses on whether an officer who has stopped a motorist for a
traffic violation may order the driver to exit the vehicle.9 2 The Court's
discussion of the ancillary issue of whether the observation of a bulge entitled
the officer to frisk the motorist is in the margin.9 3
As to the relevant issue, the Mimms opinion is conclusory-it does not
indicate what aspects of the context indicate the officer was entitled to
conclude the motorist presented a danger. Although there was not briefing on
the merits,94 the briefing on petition for certiorari would indicate a reason.
The state's briefing asserts, "Pertinent statistics indicate that routine
traffic stops involve at least as much danger to police officers as arrests for
violent crimes." 5 It further references language from Adams v. Williams96
indicating approximately thirty percent of officer shootings occurred in
interactions with persons seated in automobiles. 97 The briefing then
continues, "It is readily apparent that every time a police officer approaches
a vehicle he is potentially placing his life on the line." 98 So, from the context,
it would appear that Mimms is dispositive only as to searches in traffic stops
in which there is reasonable suspicion an undisclosed firearm is present (and
9o 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
91 The docket in Mimms reveals the following sequence: A petition for writ of certiorari, a brief in
opposition ofthat petition for certiorari and the petitioner's reply were filed from June 1977 through
October 1977. Without further briefing, on December 5, 1977, the Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari and simultaneously issued an opinion disposing of the merits, reversing the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Docket, Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (No. 76-1830-CSY).
92 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-11.
9 The opinion states:
There remains the second question of the propriety of the search once the bulge in the
jacket was observed. We have as little doubt on this point as on the first; the answer is
controlled by Terry v. Ohio, supra. In that case we thought the officer justified in
conducting a limited search for weapons once he had reasonable concluded that the
person whom he had legitimately stopped might be armed and presently dangerous.
Under the standard enunciated in that case-whether "the facts available to the officer
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate"-there is little question the officer was
justified. The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was
armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these
circumstances, any man of "reasonable caution" would likely have conducted the "pat
down."
Id. at 111-12 (footnote omitted).
9 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
95 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at 8, Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(No. 76-1830).
96 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, supra note 95, at 8 (citing
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972)).
9 Id. at 9.
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at that, only to the extent the safety implications, and implications of
suspicion of firearms possession, remain comparable forty years later).
Lastly, the Court's discussion in Arizona v. Johnson9 9 supports the view
that suspicion of dangerousness does not inherently follow from having a
suspicion a person is armed. The Court notes:
Based on [the officer's] observations and [the subject's] answers
to her questions while he was still seated in the car, [the officer]
suspected that 'he might have a weapon on him.' When he exited
the vehicle, [the officer] therefore "patted him down for officer
safety." During the patdown, [the officer] felt the butt of a gun near
[the subject's] waist. At that point [the subject] began to struggle,
and [the officer] placed him in handcuffs.' 00
Suspicion the individual was armed arose from factors such as admission of
prior incarceration for burglary, possession of a scanner (potentially
indicative of a desire to evade police), wearing clothing consistent with gang
membership and being from a location where that gang was present.10 1
Notwithstanding these premises, the Court, in remanding, concluded
that it still remained for the court below to determine whether there was
reasonable suspicion the detained individual was "armed and dangerous."102
If the Court had understood reasonable suspicion a person was armed is
sufficient to frisk any detained person, it is not clear why it would then repeat
the reference to a required finding the detained person was "armed and
dangerous."
In sum, extant Supreme Court authority does not unequivocally indicate
whether reasonable suspicion a Terry subject is armed authorizes a frisk.
IV. CONTEMPORARY LOWER COURT AUTHORITY
A. Contemporary Authority Finding Authorization for a Terry Stop for
Firearms Possession Automatically Authorizes a Frisk
There is a split in the contemporary lower court authority
concerning whether a frisk may be initiated following a stop on the
basis of suspicion merely that an individual is armed-without
additional evidence the possession is unlawful and without other
9 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
1oo Id. at 328.
101 Id.
102 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 334 n.2 (2009) ("The Arizona Court of Appeals assumed,
'without deciding, that [the officer] had reasonable suspicion that [the detained person] was armed
and dangerous.' We do not foreclose the appeals court's consideration of that issue on remand.").
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evidence of criminal activity. In United States v. Robinson,10 3 the court
examines under Terry principles1 0 4 a frisk of a passenger in a vehicle
stopped for a traffic offense (a seatbelt violation).os The court en banc
reverses a panel decision; the court purports to hold that where "the
police officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that [the subject]
was armed, the officers were, as a matter of law, justified in frisking
him and, in doing so, did not violate [the subject's] Fourth Amendment
rights." 106
That the court should not have addressed this issue is the reason for the
immediately preceding reference to what the court "purports" to hold. Under
principles of constitutional avoidance, "The Court will not 'anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it."'l07
After a lengthy analysis concluding that the mere suspicion a subject detained
under Terry principles is armed gives rise to authorization to frisk,' the
Robinson court then proceeds to indicate there were additional facts
increasing the level of suspicion of dangerousness-that the subject was
suspected of loading a firearm in a location popular for drug-trafficking, and
that the subject was evasive when asked whether he had a weapon.1 09
So we here have another manifestation of the idiosyncratic approach
some lower courts take to deny development of firearms rights. Courts
denying Second Amendment protection for actions outside the home often
will assume, without deciding, that the benefits of the Second Amendment
extend outside the home, 1 0 thereby avoiding a holding to that effect, securing
103 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (2017).
104 Id. at 699-701.
1o5 Id. at 695.
106 Id. at 701. The en banc decision produced a dissent representing the views of four judges, and a
separate concurrence that would apply a special rule for firearms possession. 846 F.3d at 706
(Wynn, J., concurring).
107 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
los Id. at 697-701.
i0 Id. at 701-02.
110 E.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876
(4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[Tjhe
Amendment must have some application in the very different context of the public possession of
firearms. Our analysis proceeds on this assumption." (citation omitted)); Hightower v. City of
Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2012) ("We agree with Judge Wilkinson's cautionary holding in
United States v. Masciandaro, that we should not engage in answering the question of how Heller
applies to possession of firearms outside of the home, including as to 'what sliding scales of
scrutiny might apply.' As he said, the whole matter is a 'vast terra incognita that courts should enter
only upon necessity and only then by small degree."') (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)).
The issue is often elided when the claim involves a challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to a more
limited restriction that can be addressed by concluding that any such right is not "clearly
established." See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) ("The judges of the
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Second Amendment rights. But here, where the issue need not be decided,
the Fourth Circuit unnecessarily focuses on matters that are dicta in
pronouncing a restrictive outcome.
Other cases following this approach include United States v. Orman, "
where the court states, "Here Officer Ferragamo's reasonable suspicion that
Orman was carrying a gun, which is all that is required for a protective
search under Terry, quickly rose to a certainty when Orman confirmed that
he was carrying a gun."I12 The court additionally notes, "Although he also
testified that Orman 'acted perfectly-very cordial,' under Terry and its
progeny a reasonably prudent man in [the officer's] circumstances would be
warranted in retrieving the gun for his safety and the safety of the mall
patrons.""'
United States v. Rodriguez1 14  authorizes a frisk and temporary
disarmament of a convenience store employee solely on the basis that the
employee was possessing a concealed firearm on store premises. The court
states:
Defendant acknowledges he was armed, but claims Officer Munoz
had no reason to believe he was dangerous. We have already
observed that a prudent officer could reasonably suspect
Defendant's handgun was loaded. That alone is enough to justify
Officer Munoz's action in removing the handgun from
Defendant's waistband for the protection of himself and others...
We will not deny an officer making a lawful investigatory stop the ability
to protect himself from an armed suspect whose propensities are unknown.
Officer Munoz did no more than was required to retrieve the gun. Officer
Munoz was entitled to remove Defendant's handgun, not to discover
evidence of a crime, but to permit him and Officer Miller to pursue their
investigation without fear of violence.115 In a footnote, the court observes,
district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in
deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand."); Deffert v. Moe, 111 F. Supp. 3d 797,
811-12 (W.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Pearson); Jefferson v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 454,460 (6th Cir. 2010).
Courts often elide developing affirmative Second Amendment rights by proceeding to the step in
which they conclude any such right was not clearly established. E.g., Burgess v. Town of
Wallingford, 569 F. App'x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2014) ("Thus, the protection that Burgess claims he
deserves under the Second Amendment-the right to carry a firearm openly outside the home-is
not clearly established law.").
486 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007).
112 Id. at 1176.
113 Id.
114 739 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 2013).
"5 Id. at 491 (citation omitted). 1ad the court wanted to do so (or thought it suitable to avoid the
constitutional issue), it could have cabined its holding by relying on the fact, referenced elsewhere
in the opinion, that the investigation was prompted by a tip that employees, "in a reportedly 'high
crime' area, were showing each other handguns," id. at 483, which might give rise to reasonable
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"We note that Defendant has never challenged Officer Munoz's
actions, or the state law applicable thereto, as contrary to the Second
Amendment."ll6
B. Contemporary Authority Finding Authorization for a Terr Stop for
Firearms Possession Does Not Automatically Authorize a Frisk
There is authority that takes the other approach-that does not apply a
restated test for frisking a seized person in terms of whether he is armed or
dangerous. In State v. Serna, the Arizona Supreme Court states:
We also disagree with the Ninth Circuit's determination that mere
knowledge or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies
the second prong of Terry, which itself involves a dual inquiry; it
requires that a suspect be "armed and presently dangerous." In a
state such as Arizona that freely permits citizens to carry weapons,
both visible and concealed, the mere presence of a gun cannot
provide reasonable and articulable suspicion that the gun carrier is
presently dangerous."'
United States v. House' " is something of an unusual case. The court
approves the lower court's determination the case involves a consensual
stop. 119 The government argued "that no reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity is necessary when a search is incident to a consensual stop,
and there need be only a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is
armed and dangerous."l2 0 The court assumed, without deciding, that to be the
case.12 ' So, although not involving a Terry seizure, the court's opinion
provides content to whether mere knowledge a person is armed is sufficient
to initiate a frisk.
The case holds there is not an adequate basis to initiate a frisk where an
officer observes that a person possesses a folded pocket knife (of the type the
officer carries on duty) and has a suspicious bulge under hisjacket, but denies
having a weapon. 12 2 The court expressly requires each of the "armed" and
suspicion of a miscellaneous crime such as disorderly conduct. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-1
(Westlaw through First Regular and Special Sessions of the 53rd Legislature (2017)).
116 Id. at 484 n..
" 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014).
" 463 F. App'x 783 (10th Cir. 2012).
1l9 Id. at 786.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 787.
122 Id. at 785, 788 (quoting the concurring opinion in United States v. Johnson, 246 F. App'x 982, 988
(6th Cir. 2007) (Cole, J., concurring), and stating, "But there was no indication that he was presently
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"dangerous" components be separately met.1 2 3 Although concluding a
reasonable officer could determine the subject was armed, 124 the court
concludes there was not an adequate basis to find the subject was
dangerous, 125 thereby invalidating the frisk.1 26
The subject denied being armed, although the officer saw he had a knife
in his pocket.1 27 The court concludes:
It is likely that many law-abiding citizens would not consider
themselves armed with a weapon, while carrying a folded pocket
knife, when approached on the street and questioned unexpectedly
by an officer. To allow a search based on the hunch that a citizen
walking down the street is illegally carrying a firearm, without
more, serves to erode the precious protections of the Second and
Fourth Amendments. 128
Lastly, the opinion in Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department29
has language that would support this approach-indicating that a conclusion
that one is armed does not inherently indicate the person is dangerous in the
context of a stop (although, in that case, the disposition is based on the stop
being invalid).3 0 The defendants made the following argument to justify the
stop:
Perhaps Shawn Northrup wished that we lived in a world where
the sight of armed gunmen walking down the road was a common
and accepted as the sight of a man walking his dog. But, Toledo,
Ohio is not Syria, or the Ukraine, or Iraq. Toledo is in America and
in America mass shootings have been on a recent and dramatic
rise. Given this troubling and deadly historical backdrop, Officer
dangerous to Officer Daley or other citizens. Being armed does not ineluctably equate with
dangerousness."). See also House, 463 F. App'x at 794 (Baldock, J., dissenting) ("Officers must
have reasonable suspicion the subject is 'armed and presently dangerous.' A citizen walking down
the street carrying a knife or gun on his person does not necessarily present a danger to police or
the public." (emphasis added in House) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 392 1, 24 (1968) (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30) (citation omitted).
123 Id. at 788.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 790.
126 Id. at 789.
127 Id. at 788.
128 Id. at 789.
129 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015).
130 The opinion states:
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited Officer Bright from responding to the call
and ascertaining through a consensual encounter whether Northrup appeared dangerous.
Until any such suspicion emerged, however, Bright's hope that Northrup "was not about
to start shooting" remains another word for the trust that Ohioans have placed in their
State's approach to gun licensure and gun possession.
Id. at 1133.
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Bright and Sergeant Ray were faced with a choice: respond to the
communities' fear and the appearance of the gunman by
performing an investigatory stop, or do nothing while Northrup
continued walking down Rochelle and hope that he was not about
to start shooting. Officers Bright and Ray chose the first option and
any other reasonable officer given the totality of the circumstances
in this case would have done likewise. 131
After that in the briefing, under a heading referencing "the Nature of
the Investigatory Stop was Limited in Scope and Duration . . .," the
defendants make the conclusory statement that the officer was entitled to
disarm the plaintiff: "Both Officer Bright's and the public's safety required
that the Plaintiffs weapon be secured so that he could not potentially cause
injury."32
The appellate court affirms denial of summary judgment for officers as
to Fourth Amendment claims, stating, "We thus affirm the district court's
conclusion that, after reading the factual inferences in the record in
Northrup's favor, Officer Bright could not reasonably suspect that Northrup
needed to be disarmed."1 3 3 As is often the case, the structure of the court's
opinion leaves some uncertainty concerning the precise contours of the
court's analysis. In summary, the opinion states:
(i) "To allow stops in this setting 'would effectively eliminate
Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed persons.' "134
(ii) The alleged suspected crime being investigated, inducing
panic, "does not cover what happened."1 35
131 Brief of Defendant-Appellants Officer David Bright and Sergeant Daniel Ray at 16, Northrup, 785
F.3d 1128 (No. 14-4050).
132 Id. at 17.
133 Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133.
134 Id. at 1132 (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993)).
135 Id.
The defendants reply briefing makes the troubling assertion that there was reasonable suspicion
there was an emergency, justifying the stop, because "To report an emergency through the 9-1-1
system when no emergency exists is a criminal offense. It was therefore, only logical for Officer
Bright to conclude that an emergency of a criminal nature involving a gun had taken place . . . ."
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellants Officer David Bright and Sergeant Daniel Ray at 9, Northrup,
785 F.3d 1128 (No. 14-4050). The "odd news" section of newspapers and websites would suggest
use of the 9-1-1 system is not in practice restricted to emergencies. E.g., Connecticut Man Calls
911 over Beef about Sandwich, MACOMB DAILY NATION-WORLD (June 16, 2012),
http://www.macombdaily.com/article/MD/20120616/NEWS04/120619620 ("A man angry that a
deli had fouled up his sandwich order decided to take his beef to police. The man ... called 911 on
Wednesday and complained that he 'specifically asked for little turkey and little ham, a lot of cheese
and a lot of mayonnaise,' and the Grateful Deli in East Hartford got it wrong."); John Snell, Aloha
Man Calls 9-1-1 over Botched Fast-Food Order, OREGONIAN (May 27, 2009),
http://www.oregonlive.com/washingtoncounty/index.ssf/2009/05/aloha-man-calls911 over
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(iii) Ohio law permits openly carrying firearms1 36 (although at one
location the opinion notes a dispatcher's statement that this is the
case if one has a concealed carry weapons permit1 37 and later
discusses the possibility the individual "was not licensed to carry
a gun"13 8 ), and does not require owners to produce licenses. 139
(iv) As to the possibility the plaintiff was not licensed to carry a
gun or that he was a felon prohibited from possessing a gun,
"Where it is lawful to possess a firearm, unlawful possession 'is
not the default status.' There is no 'automatic firearm exception'
to the Terry rule."1 40
(v) In conclusion, the court states:
And it has long been clearly established that an officer needs
evidence of criminality or dangerousness before he may detain and
disarm a law-abiding citizen. We thus affirm the district court's
conclusion that, after reading the factual inferences in the record
in Northrup's favor, Officer Bright could not reasonably suspect
that Northrup needed to be disarmed. 141
In sum, the court's discussion rejects the conclusion that one can be
stopped and disarmed merely for possessing a firearm. However, the opinion
is not as detailed as one might like concerning the interplay between the
preconditions to the stop and the preconditions to a frisk following a stop.
botch.html ("Raibin Raof Osman isn't most people. The 20-year-old Aloha man had a sleep-over
at the Washington County Jail on Memorial Day after calling 9-1-1 to complain that McDonald's
left out a box of orange juice from his drive-thru order."); Police: Man Called 911 Ten Times to
Complain about Chili Restaurant, Fox 19 Now, http://www.fox19.com/story/18904054/man-
called-911-ten-times-to-complain-about-chili-restaurant ("A Clifton man is facing charges after
police say he called 911 multiple times to complain about the service at a Skyline Chili
restaurant.").
136 Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1131.
13 Id. at 1130.
13 Id. at 1132. On the other hand, the office of the Ohio Attorney General, in a 2012 booklet, under
the caption, "Open Carry," states, "Ohio's concealed carry laws do not regulate 'open' carry of
firearms. If you openly carry, use caution. The open carry of firearms is a legal activity in Ohio."
Office of the Ohio Attorney Gen., Ohio's Concealed Carry Laws and License Application at 17
(Apr. 27, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20120705074236/http://www.ohioattorneygene
ral.gov:80/getattachment/02fflca7-bl7e-46e2-9flf-505beac65926/Concealed-Carry-Laws-
Booklet.aspx. The identical language is reproduced in the 2017 version of this document. Office of
the Ohio Attorney Gen., Ohio's Concealed Carry Laws and License Application at 15 (Mar. 21,
2017),http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Publications-Files/Publications-for-Law-Enforce
ment/Concealed-Carry-Publications/Concealed-Carry-Laws-Manual-(PDF).aspx.
13 Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1132.
140 Id. (quoting United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013); and Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266, 272 (2000)).
141 Id. at 1133.
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V. INCOHERENT AGGREGATE TREATMENT ARISING FROM
BIFURCATION
Stops of armed persons are dangerous. 142 We are examining the ability
to frisk a person whose stop was authorized only by the fact of reasonable
suspicion he possessed a weapon, i.e., excluding some additional reasonable
suspicion of imminent unlawful use of the weapon (as well as either evidence
the possession is criminal or evidence of another crime). It is thus only the
occurrence of the stop itself that gives rise to the danger.
As demonstrated in Part II.C, allowing an automatic conclusion an
armed person is dangerous, thereby automatically authorizing a frisk and
disarmament, then grants the officer great latitude to take defensive actions
under principles that do not brook restrictions on actions putatively
enhancing the officer's safety. As demonstrated in Parts II.C-.D, such stops
create substantial safety hazards.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the variation between (x) a stop
at a checkpoint, where there are "visible signs of authority," and (y) a
"roving-patrol stop," amounts to a constitutionally cognizable quantum of
difference-it is a differential that has constitutional import. In Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz,143 the Court asserts stops at checkpoints
generate less concern or fright to lawful travelers, because one stopped at a
checkpoint "can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." 44 The Court, on the
other hand, has stated, "[C]ircumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and
search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop."1 4 5
We thus know that the difference in the intrusion on liberty between a
police officer checkpoint and one involving moving officers in police cars is
of constitutional import in the balancing. The further step to allowing stops
authorizing the substantial risk to life arising from firearms being pointed at
innocents, for mere exercise of a constitutional right, 146 is overwhelmingly
more consequential. It is inherently inconsistent for a court simultaneously
142 See supra Parts II.C-.D.
143 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
144 Id. at 452-53 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)).
145 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
146 As noted above, see supra note 110, courts often assume that the right protected by the Second
Amendment extends outside the home. Or they may so hold. E.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia,
864 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("[T]he Amendment's core generally covers, carrying in public
for self-defense."); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) ("A right to bear arms
thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home."); People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321,
327 (Ill. 2013) (noting a conclusion "that the second amendment protects the right to possess and
use a firearm for self-defense outside the home"). For ease of exposition, this Article will reference
the right to bear arms outside the home as a constitutional one, although the issue is not formally
resolved under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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to assert (x) a Terry stop for mere firearms possession is authorized, because
the stop is innocuous, and (y) the subjects can, for exercise of a constitutional
right, be treated as armed and dangerous and thus be subjected to pretextual,
oppressive searches in which weapons can be pointed at them. The former
conclusion negates the latter.
This is the fundamental point. It is easy for legal doctrine to develop
building on outcomes of prior authority while eliding the underlying
premises. We now have a couplet of issues developing in the lower courts:
(x) whether reasonable suspicion a person is armed can authorize a Terry stop
and (y) if so, whether a frisk is inherently authorized. The collective
resolution must be based on internally consistent application of principles.
VI. BALANCING THE COMPONENTS
A. Overview
Turning to application of any balancing test, as a preliminary matter,
we can conclude that if a frisk would otherwise be unconstitutional, it cannot
be validated by imposing a condition on the constitutionally-protected
possession of a firearm. That would be an unconstitutional condition. 147
In this author's view, judicial retreat to balancing in this context does
not result in a deductive process that yields a compelled outcome. Rather,
reference to balancing obscures that the decision is produced by latent value
judgments unconstrained by the dictates of the relevant constitutional
language.
The benefits of freedom from an oppressive government that can
engage in suspicionless, hazardous and pretextual searches cannot be
"balanced" against safety impacts of those searches and any cognizable harm
arising from persons foregoing exercising a constitutional right for fear that
doing so will subject them to hazardous seizures. The factors are of
qualitatively different types-have different dimensions. The outcome is
unpredictable unless, on all relevant dimensions, a case at-hand presents a
more compelling case than prior precedent relied-upon in support, in which
case "balancing" yields an outcome.
147 Cf, e.g., Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (noting that consent to
enrolling in a higher education program cannot be conditioned on consent to a search; quoting
McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1319 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing conditions on government
employment)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2216 (2017); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1424-25 (1989) (describing regulatory exemptions as
occupying a "twilight zone between the forbidden and the compelled," and stating, "The doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that
the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit
altogether.").
28 [Vol. 43
Automatic Authorization of Frisks in Terry
Policymaking requires some form of comparing disadvantages and
benefits that cannot be reduced to a single scale. The point, simply, is that
retreating into "balancing" in construing the language of an adopted
constitutional provision, at least in this circumstance, takes judges out of a
cabined, analytic judicial role and puts them into a more legislative one.
For the constitutional provisions to have meaning, they need to be
interpreted in a way that does not allow judges to reach the result favored by
their alternative policy preferences. The Court has noted, "[A] statute 'is not
an empty vessel into which this Court is free to pour a vintage that we think
better suits present-day tastes."'148 The same can be said about a
constitutional provision.
This observation is supported by the District of Columbia v. Hellerl4 9
opinion. Justice Scalia there suggests that as to the Second Amendment, the
balancing has already been effected by the adoption of the amendment.'
This view, although not generating a positive construct governing
interpretation, may nevertheless be valuable.
Allowing stops and frisks for mere firearms possession will result in
some segment of the public foregoing exercise of the right, finding the
restriction makes exercise of the right unsafe."' For example, one might
assert that if the interpretative approach allows a construction that compels
abandonment of a constitutional right by persons exceeding some threshold,
it is invalid. What that threshold might be, this author cannot say. Nicholas
Johnson's analogizing Second Amendment jurisprudence to the abortion
148 Nat'l Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297 (1970)).
149 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
iso The opinion states:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been
subjected to a freestanding "interest-balancing" approach. The very enumeration of the
right takes out of the hands of government-even the Third Branch of Government-
the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness
is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope
they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad. We would not apply
an "interest-balancing" approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march
through Skokie. The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that
the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state
secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong headed views. The
Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very product of an interest
balancing by the people-which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew. And
whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests
the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.
Id. at 634-35 (citation omitted).
151 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
292018]
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
jurisprudence would suggest a very low threshold.152 That conclusion might
be further urged, whether consciously or otherwise, if there are racial
disparities, which may well be the case.15 3
Insofar as the implicit compelled forfeiture of constitutional rights is
insufficient to dispose of the issue, from a commentator's perspective, one
can merely identify circumstances that the court would need to address in
any "balancing." In that regard, the following observations come to mind:
First, Terry stops of law-abiding citizens for suspicion of firearms
possession are, as noted,154 fraught with danger. As noted above,' 5 most
Terry stops do not involve an officer withdrawing a weapon. So, authorizing
these stops for mere suspicion of firearms and possession and inherently
authorizing a frisk would not simply increase the number Terry stops and
produce a proportionate increase in the adverse consequences of hazardous
stops. Rather, the impact would be substantially amplified (more than
proportional to the increase in stops themselves), because all the additionally
authorized stops would involve ones in which the officers would be justified
in drawing weapons.
Second, extant authority suggests that the benefits of which a court may
take cognizance are less than one would expect. For reasons detailed in Part
VI.B, below, they appear limited to the harm from the transportation divorced
from suppression of crime remote from the transport itself. And the minimal
frequency with which persons are prosecuted for failure of Brady Act
152 He writes:
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court engaged an abortion claim that closely tracks
the assault weapons question. Stenberg dealt with a challenge to Nebraska's partial-birth
abortion ban. The question was whether a woman could demand access to a particular
abortion methodology known alternately as dilation and extraction ("D&X") or intact
dilation and evacuation ("intact D&E"). The majority decision, advanced by the liberal
wing of the Court, affirmed a woman's right to the abortion methodology best suited to
protect ife and health, even when lesser but still safe alternatives are available. This, in
principle, is the assault weapons question. Particularly, can the state ban guns that in
some circumstances are the best self-defense options, on the excuse that other guns
remain available?
Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion
Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1287 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914, 920-23 (2000)).
15 See infra note 161 and accompanying text. See generally Brief of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7-11, Robinson v. United
States, No. 16-1532, 2017 WL 3189042 (U.S. July 24, 2017) (providing a discussion under a
heading, "The per se rule endorsed below allows for unchecked racial profiling, as officers
encounter more citizens who are-or may be-legally armed.").
154 See supra Parts II.C-.D.
iss See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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checks"' indicates that there is not a strong federal interest in preventing that
mere possession.157
Third, any substantial efforts to engage in this type of Terry stop cannot
be expected to be successful. Criminals transporting firearms to use at other
locations can easily carry them so that they are not perceivable, e.g., inside
backpacks that do not reveal the outline of contents. Not so for those carrying
firearms for self-defense, because they need immediate access. So,
substantial enforcement efforts would increasingly target innocuous conduct.
Fourth, the best way to present a tractable framing of the issue is to
begin with the premise that a Terry stop and frisk is given to everyone who
encounters a police officer and is suspected of possession of a firearm. If
balancing is failed in that circumstance, then one needs to demonstrate the
benefits to stopping and frisking persons diminish as the number of stops
increases.
There is a strong argument that any balancing would be failed with only
modest frequencies of drawing of firearms in these stops of persons presumed
dangerous. However, there is a potentially unexpected justification for
considering, in the balancing, that firearms are drawn in each of these
justified stops of persons suspected of being armed who are presumed
dangerous. The crucial point is that the transition from stopping all, in stops
in which weapons are drawn, to intermittent stops with weapons drawn does
not involve random omissions. Rather, because pretextual stops' are
authorized,159 we are discussing a pretext-infused filter to exclude some from
intimidation and hazard.
Odious rationales for the pretextual determinations cannot be assured
to be provable.6 o So, the pretext-infused filter will incorporate odious
156 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140; and 115-158 to 115-
163, 115-167 and 115-168).
157 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
158 Although one may initially focus on racial or ethnic bases for pretextual stops, there can be other
odious reasons. See, e.g., Complaint, Picard v. Tomeo, No. 3:16-cv-01564-WWE, at 5, 9 (D.
Conn. Sept. 15, 2016) (alleging manufactured allegations that 'someone called in' a complaint
about a man 'waving a gun and pointing it at people' in connection with the arrest of an open
carrier protesting at a DULI stop, further alleging, "Defendant Tomeo said that the defendants should
issue Mr. Picard a public disturbance charge, 'then we claim that in backup we had multiple
[motorists] stopped to complain about' a man waving a gun, 'but that no one wanted to stop and
give a statement.' Tomeo emphasized the words 'then' and 'multiple' when speaking, as if
formulating the defendants' cover story aloud.").
59 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
60 More formally, one might argue the ratio:
law enforcement benefits
societal harm
increases as one considers moving from stopping and pointing weapons at all to doing so only
sometimes. But the more complete assessment compares:
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motives. Avoidance of diminishing returns to enforcement, by stopping
some, is only realized at the expense of selections increasingly dominated by
odious pretextual determinations.
Researchers assert current findings on the relationship between police
use of force and subject race are mixed.' 6 ' Thus, one cannot eliminate the
possibility that odious criteria, such as race or other improper criteria, will
influence the likelihood of pretextual stops involving drawing of weapons.
And reliance on these criteria cannot easily be proved. So, the possibility
these problematic factors will underlie the inconsistent drawing of weapons
may produce circumstances worse than drawing weapons in all cases.
B. "General Interest in Crime Control" Disregarded
Whatever balancing rubric is being applied to weigh the safety hazards
to the innocent, and any forfeiture of the right to bear arms in self-defense,
would need to be compared to the alleged benefits. If one is to "balance"
these factors, the other side of the ledger would only include the benefit from
halting the mere transport-not the benefit of elimination of remote crime.
The Supreme Court indicates in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond'62 that the
"balanced" benefits of stops for less than probable cause are limited to the
suspected unlawful activity justifying the stop. In particular, as to stops for
alleged possession of what is, to the subject, contraband, one does not take
cognizance of the benefits of crime control beyond the mere transport. The
Court states:
We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited
law enforcement benefits given a hazardous stop for all
societal harm given a hazardous stop for all
to
law enforcement benefits given a hazardous stop for some
societal harm to those stopped given a hazardous stop for them plus
societal harm arising from odious, improper pretextual hazardous stops
161 E.g., Lorie Fridell & Hyeyoung Lim, Assessing the Racial Aspects of Police Force Using the
Implicit- and Counter-Bias Perspectives, 44 J. Crim. Just. 36, 37 (2016) (stating, "The modem,
more sophisticated multivariate research has produced mixed findings;" and summarizing assorted
prior research as (i) finding "no impact of subject race on police use of force;" (ii) finding "that the
positive relationship between suspect race as Black and whether officers used force disappeared
when they controlled for suspect resistance;" and (iii) finding "that police were more likely to use
force or more force against minorities, even when the appropriate variables are controlled."). See
generally Lois James et al., Testing the Impact ofCitizen Characteristics and Demeanor on Police
Officer Behavior in Potentially Violent Encounters, 41 POLIcING 24, 24 (2017) (concluding in
simulations that demeanor was the significant factor in whether encounters escalated to a deadly
outcome).
162 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied
by some measure of individualized suspicion. We suggested in
Prouse that we would not credit the "general interest in crime
control" as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops.
Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpoint programs
that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes
closely related to the problems of policing the border or the
necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Because the primary
purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program
contravenes the Fourth Amendment. 6
The court reaches this conclusion, even though it identifies the societal harms
sought to be addressed as "severe and intractable," "creat[ing] social harms
of the first magnitude."l 64
Edmond involves checkpoints, using neutral criteria,165 to find
contraband (illegal narcotics).1 6 6 However, the principle that one does not
take cognizance of suppression of remote future criminal activity-the
principle that the "general interest in crime control" is disregarded-in
justifying a stop also applies to stops not involving neutral criteria. Delaware
v. Prouse,167 which Edmond cites, demonstrates that. Prouse invalidates
traffic stops not involving neutral criteria. The court there notes:
It has been urged that additional state interests are the
apprehension of stolen motor vehicles and of drivers under the
influence of alcohol or narcotics. The latter interest is subsumed
by the interest in roadway safety, as may be the former interest to
some extent. The remaining governmental interest in controlling
automobile thefts is not distinguishable from the general interest
in crime control.
The precise contours of this limit-exclusion of reference to the
"general interest in crime control"-are unclear. Illicit drug use requires
transport of the contraband. If the contraband could not be transported, the
use would be eliminated. But the benefits of that are not considered in
assessing stops, lacking probable cause, to find transport of the contraband.
So, the analysis clearly excludes consideration, in the analogous context at
163 Id. at 41-42 (citation omitted) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
16 Id. at 42.
65 Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 34 (majority opinion).
167 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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hand, of the benefits, for example, of interdicting firearm transport to a
location where mass casualties are planned to be inflicted.
Nothing about the articulated examination of the identified general
interest in crime control hinges on whether, or the extent to which, the
property may be contraband to some and not others. So, there is not a basis
for a different approach in considering firearms possession that may be
lawful for some but not others.
C. No Special Rule for Firearms Possession
One might assert investigations of claims of firearms possession are
different, by virtue of the nature of the harm to be prevented. The Supreme
Court in Florida v. J.L.' 68 indicates that is not the case:
Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes
justify unusual precautions. Our decisions recognize the serious
threat that armed criminals pose to public safety; Terry's rule,
which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasonable
suspicion rather than demanding that officers meet the higher
standard of probable cause, responds to this very concern. But an
automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis
would rove too far.169
That discussion concerns the reliability of information authorizing a
stop.170 The principle, however, is that the fact that the putative harm involves
mere firearms possession is, by itself, insufficient to substantially alter the
balancing that otherwise ought to apply. One does not put a heavy thumb on
the scale, in favor of validating the imposition, merely because the subject
activity involves suspicion of firearms possession. To say that harm
associated with firearm crime does not, in balancing, increase the benefits of
searches applies equally where, on the other side of the balance, the focus of
the concern is either (x) harm to innocents arising from unreliable
information, as in J.L., or (y) harm to innocents arising from dangerous
searches of innocents for mere exercise of a constitutional right, in the case
at hand.
Note the Court in JL. does not conclude no activity would be subject
to such an adjustment in the balancing. It explicitly, by way of illustration,
reserves that issue as to a "report of a person carrying a bomb."l71 Rather,
that the activity involves mere firearms possession is not enough.
168 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
169 Id. at 272.
170 Id. at 273.
171 Id.
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Reference to the number of crimes involving death from firearms and
from controlled substances would similarly support that the magnitude of the
harm associated with firearms is not qualitatively different from that
involving possession of controlled substances. Drug overdose deaths in 2016
within the United States tallied over 63,600.172 That compares to firearms
deaths in 2015 of 36,252,"' a majority of which were not from murder.17 4
Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly referenced the problem associated
with illegal narcotics as "severe and intractable," "creat[ing] social harms of
the first magnitude.""7 5 So, if at least one focused on deaths, the harms
associated with criminal firearms possession generally do not dominate those
of another context in which the Court holds ordinary Fourth Amendment
analysis applies.
In sum, neither Supreme Court precedent nor statistics concerning
deaths suggests ordinary principles should be altered to facilitate stops where
the alleged crime involves mere firearms possession.
D. Estimating the Frequencies
1. Frequencies of Stops.
Let us now turn to statistics that will reveal the extent of hazardous stops
that would be authorized if a frisk is inherently permitted in a Terry stop for
mere suspicion of firearms possession. As noted above,' 76 it is estimated
there are three million persons, not police officers, who carry firearms daily.
Let us, to produce a conservative assessment, focus solely of stops of them.
If each encounters an officer and is subject to a stop on average once per
month, there would be about thirty million Terry stops of these individuals
alone.
172 Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Drug Overdose Deaths in
the United States, 1999-2016 (Dec. 21; 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/
db294.htm.
1' Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Deaths: Final Data for
2015, at tbl. 1-3, 66 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REP. (Nov. 27, 2017) https://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/data/nvsr/nvsr66/nvsr66_06_tables.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A35%2C%22gen%22%3A0
%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22FitH%22%7D%2C556%5D.
174 The FBI's web site reports 2015 crime statistics showing 9,616 firearms murders in the United
States, including Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See FBI, 2015 Crime in the United States,
Murder by State, Types of Weapons, 2015, tbl. 20, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-
in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-20 (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). However, the table excludes data from
Florida. A different table shows a total of 1,041 murders in Florida, with any instrumentality, in
2015. Id. tbl. 4, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-4 (last
visited Oct. 14, 2017). So, the comparable statistics vary by less than four percent.
17 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
76 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
2018] 35
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
Let us now assess how much of an increase in Terry stops involving
officers drawing firearms-high-risk Terry stops-this would be. A very
conservative estimate can be found by then comparing the number of Terry
stops in a big city, and extrapolating it to the entire population of medium-
and large-sized cities.
At the height of the intrusive and now invalidated'77 Terry stop regime
in New York City, the frequency was approximately 0.084 stops per person.
The peak involved 685,724 stops in 2011 in New York City.1 78 The New
York City population was 8,175,133 in 2010.179 So, ignoring any variation in
the rate arising from a change in the population, that would translate to a rate
of 0.084 Terry stops per person.so
Although that rate was highly controversial, and gave rise to ultimately
successful challenge in litigation,'"' let us instead turn to Philadelphia, where
the City of Brotherly Love somewhat astonishingly almost doubled that rate
of Terry stops. The rate of stops in Philadelphia reached 0.158 per person in
2009.182
The total population in 2010 of all cities with a population of at least
100,000 was 84,133,628.183 So, one might aggressively estimate the extant
frequency of Terry stops (and thus produce a conservative estimate of the
percent increase arising from stopping licensed persons who carry firearms
daily) by extrapolating the Philadelphia peak rate to all medium and large
cities. That would yield an estimated 13 million Terry stops.1 84
But the extant Terry stops are primarily not as hazardous as those to be
added in the balancing. The New York Times reports approximately 1 in 70
Terry stops in New York City resulted in a weapon being withdrawn (one in
sixty-five and one in seventy-one for stops of Blacks and whites,
respectively)."' In approximately one-third of the stops where a weapon was
drawn it also was "point[ed]." If one of seventy of our estimated extant Terry
stops (extrapolating nationwide the peak Philadelphia rate) involve a weapon
being pointed, that would equate to approximately 200,000 Terry stops per
year involving police officers' firearms being drawn.' 86 Using the number of
177 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
178 N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, supra note 24, at 4 n.11.
179 U.S. Census, Population Estimates, https://web.archive.org/web/20150915233910/
http://www.census.gov:80/popest/data/cities/totals/2014/SUB-EST2014.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2018) (collecting population data for cities and states).
1so That is, 685,724 / 8,175,133= 0.084.
181 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
182 David Rudovsky, Stop-and-Frisk: The Power of Data and the Decision in Floyd v. City of New
York, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 123 (2013).
183 Cf U.S. Census, supra note 179 (providing the data).
184 That is, 84,133,628 x 0.158 = 13,293,113.
185 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
186 That is, 13,293,113 / 70 = 189,902.
36 [Vol. 43
Automatic Authorization of Frisks in Terry
stops in 2012 in New York City, 533,042,187 and conservatively taking the
2010 population, we would .have 0.065 stops per person.' That rate,
extended to all large and medium-sized cities, would equate to approximately
80,000 Terry stops involving firearms being drawn by police officers. 8 9
So, we can create pairs of assumptions that might be relevant to any
"balancing." Panel A in the below table shows rates of stopping persons
(other than police officers) who are licensed to carry firearms and do so daily,
and the frequencies in which those stops would need to involve an officer
drawing a firearm essentially to double the city Terry stops in which firearms
are drawn.190
The first column identifies the relevant base rate being assumed. Both
are high (creating conservative assumptions). One is the peak Philadelphia
rate and the other is the New York City rate in 2012.
The second column indicates the frequency with which these daily
carriers would be stopped. The third indicates the frequency with which the
Terry stop would need to involve drawing a firearm to produce essentially a
doubling of the city dangerous Terry stop numbers. 19 1 The fourth column
compares that third column to the frequency with which a weapon is drawn
in general Terry stops, i.e., not limited to the stops where a subject is
reasonably suspected of possessing a firearm.1 92
Panel B shows the comparable information for the stops that would
equate to adding a number of Terry stops with a firearm drawn equal to ten
times the number in medium- and large-sized cities.193 Panel C shows the
comparable information for a one hundred times increase.1 94
187 N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, supra note 24, at 4 n.11.
188 That is, 8,175,133 x 533,042 = 0.065.
189 That is, 84,133,628 x 0.065 = 78,124.
190 For ease of exposition, this phrase is used to reference adding to the United States' Terry stops in
which officers draw firearms a number equal to the estimate of such stops in medium- and large-
sized cities currently (estimated by extrapolating high rates).
191 The rates are computed as follows:
Panel A:
3,000,000 x 0.067 = 201,000.
3,000,000 x 10 x 0.0067 = 201,000.
3,000,000 x 0.027 = 81,000.
3,000,000 x 10 x 0.0027 = 81,000.
192 The rates are computed by multiplying the figure in the preceding column by 70, i.e., dividing it
by the New York City rate of 1/70.
193 The computations are:
10 x 200,000 / (3,000,000 x 5) = 13.3%
10 x 200,000 / (3,000,000 x 10) = 6.7%
10 x 80,000 / (3,000,000 x 5) = 5.3%
10 x 80,000 / (3,000,000 x 10) = 2.7%
194 The computations are:
100 x 200,000 / (3,000,000 x 10) = 66.7% 100 x 80,000 / (3,000,000 x 10) = 27.7%
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Panel A: Adding the Extant Medium- and Large-Sized City Stops w/
Firearms
Philadelphia Rate (0.158) Once per year
Ten times per
Philadelphia Rate (0.158) year
NYC 2012 Rate (0.065) Once per year
Ten times per
NYC 2012 Rate (0.065) year




NYC 2012 Rate (0.065)









Panel C: Adding One Hundred Times the Medium- and Large-Sized
City Stops w/ Firearms
Ten times per
Philadelphia Rate (0.158) year
Ten times per
66.7%
NYC 2012 Rate (0.065) year . 26.7%
Note-Computations are rounded to eliminate false precision.
46.7
18.7
These arithmetic computations allow us to phrase the balancing in the
following way:
Do we believe:
(i) the benefit associated with a scheme of stopping persons
reasonably suspected of firearms possession, with a frequency that
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(ii) the burden arising from increasing the number of Terry stops
in which a firearm is drawn, essentially doubling the non-small
city frequency-
if officers in these Terry stops assumed to be high-risk are expected to draw
weapons only 4.69 times or 1.89 times more frequently than in Terry stops
generally?
If the scheme of enforcement contemplates stopping these licensees
materially more than once per year, the benefits would need to outweigh the
above-referenced essential doubling of the number of Terry stops in which
an officer draws a firearm. That is because the implied rate of drawing a
firearm in these stops is so close to the ordinary rate for all Terry stops that a
lower rate of officers drawing firearms would be implausible.
Some surely would conclude the scope of dangerous Terry stops was
sufficiently noxious, at the Philadelphia or New York City rates. For them,
doubling Terry stops at each medium- and large-sized city would require a
quite compelling benefit.
Because extant Terry stop frequencies have been highly controversial,
it is submitted that there would need to be a strong showing for an approach
that merely doubled the extant rate of Terry stops in which a weapon was
withdrawn. That would involve, as noted, stopping each lawful daily licensee
once per year, if one takes as the current baseline the very peak rate in
Philadelphia or the 2012 rate in New York City, if 6.7% or 2.7% of the stops
result in an officer drawing a firearm, respectively-modest rates in light of
those for Terry stops generally.
There is in fact a basis to conclude a much higher rate of drawing a
firearm ought to be contemplated in balancing. We are considering what the
relevant theory authorizes government agents to do. If a frisk is automatically
authorized because the subjects are necessarily classified as reasonably
suspected of being armed and dangerous, then the government agents are
inherently authorized to draw a weapon.195
Pretexual Terry stops are apparently authorized, 196 and one supposes
pretextual searches are worse than non-pretextual ones (but merely are not
so much worse that the possibility of pretextual searches can, in the typical
case, negate the validity of a stop). So, it is not at all clear that if stopping
and drawing weapons on everyone possessing a firearm is unreasonable,
stopping some, using potentially odious filters, should be more favorably
viewed. And the comparison is stark if one takes that vantage point of
stopping and drawing a weapon on all firearms possessors.
195 See supra Part II.C.
196 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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To put it another way, it would be a burden on the government to
identify a reason why a reduction in the drawing of a weapon can be justified
as making the stops and searches less burdensome. And, because these stops
can be pretextual, and wide latitude is granted officers in these self-defense
determinations, there is not an apparent way that burden could be met.
2. The Balancing Rubric-a Low Priority.
It is also submitted that these mere possession crimes are not a high
priority and thus, eliminating them does not adequately authorize a
substantial increase in Terry stops involving drawn weapons. Frandsen found
that only 0.16% (1.6 per 1,000) of Brady Act check denials resulted in
prosecutions. 197 The denials can, of course, be because the federal database
is wrong. But, absent errors, these denials would inherently involve criminal
acts as part of seeking firearm possession, as the check is initiated by
affirmation the firearms possession is lawful under federal law. The process
requires information from the applicant's identification be recorded and
stored for at least five years. 1 98 Nevertheless, this low-hanging fruit for
prosecution is only rarely harvested.
That is the case even if one concludes database errors are
overwhelmingly responsible for denials. For example, if 95% of the denials
are from database or other processing errors, we would still be considering
federal prosecution of only 0.16% / 5%-3%-of the folks for whom the
denial was not a database error. Such a low rate belies the claim that
prosecuting the mere possession is a high priority.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article examines whether a Terry stop initiated for reasonable
suspicion a person is armed inherently authorizes treatment of the detainee
as armed and dangerous (and thus authorizes a frisk). The relevant Supreme
Court jurisprudence is equivocal; and contemporary lower court
jurisprudence is in conflict. This Article concludes not.
197 Ronald J. Frandsen, Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2007: Federal and State Investigations and
Prosecutions of Firearm Applicants Denied by a NICS Check in 2007, at 5, 7 (Nat'l Criminal
Justice Reference Serv. Doe. 227604, July 2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/bjs/grants/227604.pdf (indicating that of 73,992 FBI denials referred to ATF Brady
Operations, there were 122 or fewer that were not declined for prosecution, a rate of 0.16%).
198 The instructions on the form state: "The transferee/buyer must provide a valid govemment-issued
photo identification document to the transferor/seller that contains the transferee's/buyer's name,
residence address, and date of birth." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF
E-Form 4473, OMB No. 1140-0020, at 5 (Oct. 2016) (providing instruction to Question 18a). The
identification information is required to be recorded on a form. Id. at 2 (question 18a). The form is
required to be kept by the dealer for at least five years. 27 C.F.R. § 478.129(b) (Westlaw through
Nov. 22, 2017). The retention period for completed transactions is longer. Id.
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. Most fundamentally, insofar as the stop is authorized because it is
supposed the stop is a mere inconvenience and thus is not unduly
burdensome, it is inconsistent to then conclude that the stop inherently
authorizes the pointing of firearms at the subject. Such stops are not mere
inconveniences.
More broadly, this Article sketches some factors relevant to any
putative judicial balancing that might be recited as justifying frisks in this
context. One approach to balancing whether such seizures are reasonable
would involve first examining the scope of what would be authorized-
namely, the seizure at gunpoint of each person lawfully possessing a firearm
each and every time he encountered an officer.
Of course, that is not what would happen. And one might object to
framing the issue in terms of what is authorized. Insofar as what is authorized
is found unreasonable, transitioning the focus to what will happen requires
one assess the manner in which persons will be filtered for these intrusive
stops. It appears pretextual stops are authorized. So, if stopping all is
unreasonable, that then requires the government to justify that:
(x) the benefits of transitioning to searching only some outweigh
(y) the loss of efficacy (arising from more limited stops) plus the
disadvantages of the filtering of those subjected to search by
odious criteria that allowing pretextual Terry stops accommodates.
It is submitted that even modest frequencies of searching people who
lawfully possess firearms will result in large percentage increases in the most
hazardous Terry stops. And because the extant hazardous Terry stops have
been quite controversial, it is unsound to authorize a substantial increase in
them, in a context that allows full reign for odious pretextualism.

